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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a symposium on the history and legacy of President Hoover’s 
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, popularly 
known as the Wickersham Commission, it is impossible to ignore 
volume eleven, the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement,1 and in 
particular the more than half of the volume focused on abusive police 
interrogation methods, the report entitled The Third Degree.2  This 
report generated an immediate and dramatic response in 1931 when it 
was published, and it has influenced ideas about policing for 
generations. 
Interestingly, though written by, and often read by, lawyers, The 
Third Degree argues that politics—rather than law—is the most 
promising tool for mitigating police misconduct: 
 For these evils many remedies have been proposed.  Some of 
them call for new legislation.  But the law as it now stands is 
sufficient.  The difficulty is that it is either not enforced or is 
deliberately disobeyed—and by the very persons charged with its 
enforcement. 
 
* Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.  Thanks 
to Adam Fleisher for his excellent research assistance. 
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [herinafter REPORT ON LAWLESNESS]. 
2. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter H. Pollak & Carl S. Stern, The Third Degree, in 
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 1, at 13. 
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 Statutes can not [sic] cope with the third degree nor can 
police regulations.  Without the will to enforce them, these 
become words upon a printed page. 
The real remedy lies in the will of the community.  If the 
community insists upon higher standards in police, prosecutors, 
and judges, the third degree will cease to be a systematic 
practice.3 
In the last paragraphs of the report, the three authors, led by 
Harvard Law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., noted an essential and 
non-legal precondition to political change generated by public concern: 
 But before the community can express its will it must know 
when, how, and to what extent these abuses are perpetrated.  To 
this end certain things may prove of value: 
 Facts as to the detention and treatment of prisoners should 
be made a matter of public record so that there may be a check 
upon the charges of the prisoners on the one hand and upon the 
denials of the police on the other.  One way to accomplish this is 
by keeping records of the times of arrest and detention; of the 
places to which prisoners are taken; of the interviews of police or 
prosecutors with prisoners; of the times at which interrogations 
begin and end; of the visible injuries to prisoners.  Although 
there may be occasional failures to keep records and occasional 
falsifications, a routine of this kind, once established, should 
furnish a foundation of dependable information. 
 The press can accomplish much by constant publicity. 
 In every locality there should be some disinterested agency—
bar association, public or voluntary defender, or civic body—to 
which a citizen, especially one who is poor and uninfluential, may 
report abuses with the knowledge that he will be protected 
against retaliation and that his complaint will be searchingly 
investigated.4 
Thus, in discussing what could be done to improve police conduct, 
The Third Degree advocated developing empirical evidence about 
policing rather than refining the law. 
The report itself furnished precisely the kind of concrete information 
about police conduct it argued was necessary.  Over time, the authors’ 
 
3. Id. at 191. 
4. Id. at 191–92. 
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considerable effort to establish the contours of the problem of abusive 
police interrogation with persuasive detail and documentation has 
probably had more impact than their legal analysis or policy proposals.  
In the Supreme Court’s famous Miranda opinion, for example, decades 
after the Wickersham Commission’s work, the Court cited the Report on 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement as clear evidence that abusive 
interrogation practices “flourished,” at least when the report was 
written.5  The Court went on to discuss policing manuals for 
contemporary evidence of interrogation practices, and implied in doing 
so that similarly persuasive empirical evidence of police interrogation 
practices after The Third Degree was simply unavailable.6  In a way, the 
report’s influence vindicates Chafee and his co-authors: it suggests 
dependable information about policing is crucial to governing the police 
effectively and yet is difficult to find. 
Though The Third Degree emphasized this point eighty years ago, in 
this brief essay I argue that today we still lack enough information about 
what the police do to shape their conduct effectively.  Governing the 
police through the local political process and regulating them under 
state and federal law both require data about local conditions and the 
costs and benefits of alternative policing strategies.  Yet we lack that 
data.7  The authors of The Third Degree understood well one of the 
obstacles to developing that information—the opposition of some 
officers.  But they neglected other barriers, specifically, the reasons why 
police chiefs, local public officials, state legislatures and agencies, and 
federal actors do not require officers to collect and make accessible the 
kind of data about policing required to inform the political and 
regulatory process.  Thus, The Third Degree failed to foresee our 
present situation: data collection and research efforts that fall far short 
of what we would need to make informed judgments about policing.  
Until efforts to produce information about policing improve, our 
 
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 & n.5 (1966) (quoting REPORT ON 
LAWLESSNESS, supra note 1)); see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 n.2 (1961) 
(citing the report’s most legal proposal for mitigating the problem of abusive interrogations); 
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 201–02 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
6. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 n.8. 
7. I have noted other aspects of the data problem in policing policy and law elsewhere.  
See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 772, 797 n.139, 
815 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, The Problem]; Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights 
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5, 28–34 (2009) [hereinafter 
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights]. 
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communities cannot “express [their] will” and the body of law 
addressing the police—though much more extensive than that at the 
time of the Commission’s work—may well equally risk being mere 
“words upon a printed page.” 
In Part I, I expand upon the work of The Third Degree’s authors by 
describing how information about police conduct assists local 
governance and state and federal regulation of policing.  In Part II, I 
argue that police chiefs and local government officials do not and are 
unlikely to generate data about the police without external regulation.  
In Part III, I contend that while existing federal law and agency efforts 
provide for some data collection about policing, those efforts are flawed, 
stymied by institutional and legal limitations.  As a result, we do not 
have the data we need to secure effective and rights-protecting policing. 
II. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN SHAPING POLICE CONDUCT 
The Third Degree authors advocated three means of securing and 
distributing information about policing.  First, they advocated creating 
data about the big picture by requiring police to record their activities 
and make those records available to the public.8  Second, they argued 
for incident-specific investigations of police conduct by “disinterested 
agenc[ies].”9  And third, they pushed for distributing information about 
police practices to the public through the press.10  These mechanisms are 
important, but they are not always available, even today.11  Even if they 
were, they would not provide information sufficient to guide political 
judgment and policy on policing. 
Policing in the United States is governed first and foremost by the 
local political process.  Local communities elect council members and 
mayors who hire police chiefs and fund department budgets.12  Those 
 
8. Chafee et al., supra note 2, at 191–92. 
9. Id. at 192. 
10. Id. 
11. Police departments collect some data about their activities, but not as much as would 
be useful, and they often share it only reluctantly with the public.  See infra notes 30–40 and 
accompanying text.  Allegations of police misconduct get investigated, but intermittently, as 
in federal lawsuits; inadequately, as by many civilian review boards; and internally, as by 
administrative units in the police departments themselves.  By contrast, the 24-hour news 
cycle, the widespread availability of video recording in cell phones, and the development of 
social media and video-sharing websites have resulted in a level of publicity for police 
wrongdoing unimaginable at the time of the National Commission’s work. 
12. For instance, in 2007 and 2008, aggregate local expenditures on police protection 
were roughly $72.7 billion and $77.6 billion, respectively.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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police chiefs and the limits of those budgets largely dictate how much 
and what kinds of policing we have.  State and federal law also regulate 
the police, constraining the local process with law that prohibits some 
police conduct; conditioning how officers may be hired, trained, and 
managed; and discouraging wrongdoing by officers.13  Information is 
crucial both to governing the police effectively through local politics and 
to the project of regulating them through state and federal law. 
The voting public needs information about crime conditions, what its 
police departments do, and the costs and benefits of alternative policing 
practices, in order to develop and express preferences about policing in 
elections and other political venues.  New Yorkers, for example, cannot 
easily decide whether to push for changes in the New York Police 
Department’s stop-and-frisk policy if they do not know how many stop-
and-frisks take place, what those practices mean to individuals and 
communities subject to them, what crimes stop-and-frisks deter or 
detect and to what extent, and whether alternative, less-intrusive 
policing strategies can equally serve the same goals. 
Voters require similar kinds of information to uncover and mitigate 
agency costs imposed by public officials.  Police chiefs and mayors are 
likely to provide too much, overly intrusive, or ill-chosen policing 
practices if they experience reputational and political gains from doing 
so.14  Critics recently accused Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa 
of transferring officers from the General Services Department to the 
Los Angeles Police Department in order to come closer to Villaraigosa’s 
campaign pledge of increasing the department to 10,000 officers.15  
 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 at 274 tbl.436 (2012).  In the same 
years, federal outlays for federal law enforcement activities were $19.6 billion and $24.6 
billion, respectively (the amount has increased considerably since the September 11th 
terrorist attacks).  Id. at 312 tbl.473.  And in those same years, all Department of Justice law-
enforcement-related grants to local and state governments totaled roughly $3.1 billion and 
$2.2 billion, respectively.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO STATES FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2007 at 15 tbl.1 (2008); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO STATES FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2008 at 15 tbl.1 (2009). 
13. See Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 795. 
14. See, e.g., Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 46–47 (“Often the 
economic and social costs and benefits to a city are not translated efficiently into economic 
and political costs for the individual governmental actors, and in other cases, financial, 
reputational, and professional costs and benefits to agents do not accrue efficiently to the 
city.”). 
15. See David Zahniser & Richard Winton, LAPD Force Tops 10,000, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
8, 2013, at AA1 (“‘It's an increase for show,’ said Kevin James, a candidate for mayor in the 
March 5 election who has questioned Villaraigosa's LAPD hiring goals.  ‘The mayor really 
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Citizens can only decide whether such a management decision is serving 
personal rather than public ends if they have a way to determine 
whether it is unreasonably costly given its benefits.  That determination 
demands data about the economic and social costs of police practices, 
and in this case, organizational strategies. 
If data about crime rates and the costs and benefits of policing 
practices are crucial to voters, they are equally important to police chiefs 
and other high-ranking department officials who develop and 
implement law enforcement strategies and procedures.  In every 
department, for example, a chief must decide whether to assign patrol 
officers to traditional foot beats or to put them in cars.  That allocation 
depends in part on an assessment of the extent of local street crime and 
how effective foot and mobile patrols are at stopping and deterring that 
crime.   
Whether informed or intuitive, implicit or express, chiefs make 
dozens of cost-benefit decisions in running a department.  They use 
undercover officers, for example, if they believe them more effective at 
addressing costly crimes than they are damaging of the public trust, and 
engage in foot pursuits of non-violent criminals if they believe the law 
enforcement benefits outweigh the risks of injury to officers.  Without 
research and data, those estimates will be unreliable, if not wildly wrong.   
A similar argument can be made about city budgeting decisions for 
police departments, policy choices made by chiefs and local 
governments about daily police practices, and the like.  For actors 
making such decisions, data about crime and social disorder informs 
where and what kind of policing objectives should be pursued; research 
about the economic and social costs of alternative police practices 
illuminate plausible means of pursuing those goals; and information 
about existing police policies and practices reveals the potential costs of 
changing direction. 
Regulators need similar kinds of information.  Legislatures and 
administrative agencies often shape police conduct in order to 
compensate for inadequate local protection of individual civil rights or 
to reduce agency costs by local public officials.  In order to have a basis 
for pursuing those goals cost-effectively, state and national decision-
 
wanted to get to 10,000 one way or the other before he left office, and this was the way he 
could do it under the current budget constraints.’”); id. at AA2 (“Councilman Paul Koretz, 
who opposed the layoffs, said the movement of the 60 building patrol officers to the LAPD 
was ‘a little smoke and mirrors.’”).  
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makers need information about local crime conditions and police 
practices, national data for comparing localities, and research about the 
costs and benefits policing alternatives and reforms. 
The current policy debate over how police officers should use 
conducted energy devices, such as Tasers, is illustrative.  Some 
advocates have argued that because of the danger Tasers pose, police 
should use them more narrowly than existing practice in many 
departments, limiting them only to circumstances when deadly force 
would be permitted.16  If this goal were desirable, Congress might 
promote it by creating a grant program to subsidize Tasers in 
departments with such policies, just as it presently provides funding for 
body armor for police departments that adopt policies mandating that 
officers wear that armor on patrol.17  Determining whether to create 
such a program requires understanding the likely consequences of 
alternative policy choices both for suspects and for law enforcement 
objectives, including the physical risks of conducted energy devices on 
suspects and whether officers are prone to overuse them.18  Without data 
on these consequences, Congress has little reason to know whether new 
programs are warranted. 
Agencies also need data to regulate policing effectively.  One 
method the Department of Justice uses to promote constitutional 
policing is to investigate and sue police departments that are engaged in 
a pattern and practice of constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141.  In these suits, the Department seeks to negotiate an agreement 
on a set of significant departmental reforms likely to prevent future 
constitutional violations.  The Department’s efforts under § 14141 will 
only be as effective as the reform measures that it endorses in its 
settlements.  If the Department of Justice secures the wrong reforms, it 
could increase a department’s costs or reduce its effectiveness without 
 
16. E.g., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., USE OF TASERS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES: GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2006); USA: Stricter Limits Urged as 
Deaths Following Police Taser Use Reach 500, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/usa-stricter-limits-urged-deaths-following-police-taser-use-
reach-500-2012-02-15.  As Amnesty International acknowledges, many of those deaths are 
attributed to other causes.  Id. 
17. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UPDATED FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) FOR 
THE BVP PROGRAM MANDATORY WEAR REQUIREMENT (2011), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bvpbasi/docs/FAQsBVPMandatoryWearPolicy.pdf. 
18. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER 
LESS-LETHAL WEAPONS 2 (2011). 
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improving civil rights protection.19  The Department of Justice, like 
other legal actors who monitor and seek to influence police conduct, 
cannot assess which remedial measures are likely to be most effective 
and efficient without information about how particular policing 
management practices affect police conduct and crime control.20 
State and federal actors need information about policing not only to 
regulate the police directly, but also to promote cost-effective criminal 
justice policy more broadly.  Every state criminal law generates 
additional police discretion to search or arrest suspects and, secondarily, 
grants law enforcement authority to use physically coercive techniques 
to conduct those searches and arrests or to protect an officer engaged in 
them, if necessary.  Every search, arrest, and use of force deprives a 
citizen of privacy, autonomy, or bodily integrity, as well as imposing 
often significant economic costs.  These harms, imposed by the police, 
are part of the cost of criminalizing additional conduct.  But it is hard for 
those contemplating expanding criminal law to consider such costs 
effectively if they have no way to assess their extent.  Similarly, state 
criminal procedure laws, such as those mandating custodial arrests for 
domestic violence misdemeanors,21 may deter future violations and 
prevent continuing violence, but also may consume valuable police 
resources and interfere with employment and immigration status for 
those arrested.  Without some understanding of the effects of 
 
19. See Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 41. 
20. Id. at 5, 34.  Courts also regulate the police based on empirical conclusions.  Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, for example, requires courts to consider the nature of the intrusion on 
the individual, the strength of the government’s interest in the intrusion, and the 
consequences for law enforcement of various rules interpreting the Constitution’s 
requirements for police searches and seizures.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–
09 (2005); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1990).  Miranda doctrine 
assumes warnings are effective to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial police 
interrogation.  Without research on police practices, these conclusions are likely to be 
supported only by intuition.  See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; id. at 411–13 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–33 (2001); United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979); Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 769–71 (discussing empirical 
and causal judgments courts must make in Fourth Amendment and Miranda law). 
21. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West 2012) (“Whenever a peace officer 
determines . . . that a family violence crime . . . has been committed . . . such officer shall 
arrest the person or persons suspected of its commission and charge such person or persons 
with the appropriate crime.”); D.C. CODE § 16-1031 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140 
(2012) (“Whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a family or 
household member or dating partner has been abused, the officer shall immediately use all 
reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including: [a]rresting the abusive party . . . .”). 
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mandatory arrests on the incidence of domestic violence, on other law 
enforcement goals, and on individual victims and suspects, states have 
little basis for deciding whether to enact such a rule. 
Even when state and federal actors legislate to serve broader 
purposes, they frequently find judgments dependent on law 
enforcement data unavoidable.  For example, many federal statutes are 
designed to protect individual privacy beyond the protection offered by 
constitutional law.  For each such statute, Congress must determine 
whether law enforcement should be restricted from accessing the 
personal information at issue differently than others.22  Thus, Congress 
has exempted police from regulation in the Video Voyeurism 
Prevention Act and the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection 
Act;23 required law enforcement to make administrative requests for 
information in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act;24 and demanded a 
warrant or subpoena before police gain access to information protected 
by Title III of the Wiretap Act or the Video Privacy Protection Act.25  
These choices depend on assessments of how significant the protected 
 
22. See Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information 
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 485, 494–99 (2013). 
23. The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2006), prohibits 
the intentional capturing of an image of a private area of an individual without consent, 
assuming the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  But it does not apply to law 
enforcement.  See § 1801(c) (“This section does not prohibit any lawful law enforcement, 
correctional, or intelligence activity.”).  Similarly, the Telephone Records and Privacy 
Protection Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a), bars the fraudulent obtaining of confidential 
phone records but exempts law enforcement.  See § 1039(g) (“This section does not prohibit 
any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement 
agency of the United States, a State, or political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence 
agency of the United States.”). 
24. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201(a), 
100 Stat. 1848, 1861 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006)); Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 104-191, § 3486(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 1936, 
2018 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A), 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see also Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, § 152(a), 117 Stat. 1964, 1964–
66 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c–2(f)). 
25. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 
82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518) (“Procedure for interception of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications”); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(2)(C) (codifying the warrant, subpoena, or court order requirement); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(3) (requiring that any court order “issue only with prior notice to the consumer and 
only if the law enforcement agency shows that there is probable cause to believe that the 
records or other information sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry”). 
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information is to criminal investigation, what role criminal investigation 
plays in detecting and deterring crime, and how much individuals suffer 
from police access to private information.  Without the necessary 
research and data, such analysis is guesswork . 
As these examples suggest, several kinds of political and legal actors 
benefit from data about policing.  Local voters, police chiefs, and other 
local officials who make police policy use empirical judgments to form 
views about what that policy should be and whether it is being 
effectively implemented.  State and federal legislatures and 
administrative agencies use data to regulate the police further and also 
to pursue other legal goals that can affect law enforcement.  In their 
sundry tasks, actors in these institutions make judgments about the 
social and financial costs of particular policing strategies and about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of those strategies in reducing fear, crime, 
and public disorder.  Explicitly or not, those judgments depend, first, on 
assessments of conditions on the ground, such as the extent and costs of 
crime, and, second, on predictions about the effects of alternative legal 
rules and policing strategies.  In this way, public policy and legal 
decisions about policing depend heavily on empirical judgments.  The 
availability of data and research will determine how well-founded those 
assessments are. 
III. POLICYMAKERS, INCENTIVES, AND INFORMATION 
The Third Degree authors viewed officer reluctance to provide 
information to be the primary obstacle to a community informed about 
its police department’s activities.  They suggested that routinizing 
information production would help, and it has.26  Police officers act 
much as Chafee and his co-authors imagined they would: they produce a 
substantial amount of information about their activities pursuant to 
departmental policies and procedures that mandate that they do so.  
Thus, police officers write reports about their arrests, their uses of force, 
and their responses to citizen calls for service, among other subjects.  
They keep daily activity logs, arrest logs, and incident logs.  In fact, part 
of what it means to be a police officer is to write frequent reports.27  Yet, 
despite this fact, the result The Third Degree authors envisioned has not 
 
26. Chafee et al., supra note 2, at 191–92. 
27. Every basic training academy teaches report writing to police recruits.  See BRIAN A. 
REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 
ACADEMIES, 2006, at 6 tbl.11 (2009). 
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come to pass.  The information the public has about policing remains 
quite limited. 
The problem is that police officers are an easily overcome obstacle 
to information collection, but cities and police departments are not.  
Though officers will collect information when police chiefs and local 
governments require them to do so, they will collect only that 
information and only in the form mandated.  Moreover, that 
information will only become public when chiefs or local governments 
make it so (in the absence of state or federal law).  In practice, police 
chiefs and other local government actors often limit rather than promote 
information availability.  Cities and police departments sometimes 
actively inhibit the collection of information about police by, for 
example, requiring secrecy when they settle civil suits for police 
misconduct or discouraging citizens from filing complaints about officer 
conduct.28  Other times, police departments simply fail to produce 
records that could improve political and regulatory decision-making 
about intrusive police activities.29  Thus, for example, departments often 
require no reports for consensual searches or for Terry stops.  Even 
when departments collect information, they may do so in ways that 
make it impossible to aggregate the records or compare them with data 
from other departments.  Departments often, for example, keep only 
paper files and use anomalous report forms and categories,30 and they 
are much more receptive to video cameras in police cars than to 
collecting traffic stop data.31  Finally, even if data are kept, able to be 
 
28. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the 
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 760, 775–76 (2004) (discussing secrecy provisions 
in civil settlements against police officers and departments); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
N.J., THE CRISIS INSIDE POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 9–12 (2009) (discussing common ways 
police departments inhibit citizens from filing complaints against police officers). 
29. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1045–52 (2010) 
(discussing major departments that do not collect information regarding civil suits and 
settlements for police misconduct). 
30. See William A. Geller & Hans Toch, Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of 
Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 292, 297–303 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) 
(describing the need for national data on the use of force, advocating improvements to the 
current national data collection system, and recommending improving and standardizing 
arrest reports, use of force reports, service calls, field contacts, and citizen complaint 
procedures to permit useful national data for comparing departments). 
31. E.g., Christine Won, Local Police Chiefs Talk about Racial Data Collection, 
JOURNALTIMES.COM, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.journaltimes.com/news/local/article_6a6ddca
c-52b6-11df-bb5d- 001cc4c03286.html. 
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aggregated, and internally available, departments may refuse to release 
them to the public.32  Thus, as a result of choices by police chiefs and 
local government officials, voters, regulators, municipalities, and even 
chiefs themselves lack basic information about police conduct.33 
This occurs because police chiefs and mayors have inadequate 
incentives to provide many of the kinds of data that would facilitate 
effective governance and regulation.  In an ideal world, public decision 
makers would invest in information until the marginal social benefit of 
additional research for improved decision-making was equal to the 
marginal social costs of additional research.34  But the reality is that 
public actors who shape policing—from the officers themselves to local 
politicians—often face incentives that undermine data collection and 
research on policing as well as distribution of information about policing 
to the public. 
On one hand, better information can make policing more effective, 
and those who develop and use such information are likely to be 
rewarded for that success.  A police chief who makes good policies as a 
result of good investments in obtaining information can be rewarded 
with a good reputation, increased professional independence, and an 
extended and potentially lucrative career.35  Thus, there are significant 
 
32. Those interested in information about police conduct often must litigate to obtain it.  
See, e.g., Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Statutory Provisions Relating to Public Access to Police Records, 82 A.L.R.3d 19, 23–24 (1978) 
(collecting cases in which litigants seek information from police departments and are refused 
unless required by state law to provide the information); Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst 
Corp. v. City of Albany, 63 A.D.3d 1336, 1336 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (involving refused 
request for “documents pertaining to the alleged use of official Albany Police Department 
channels to purchase military-style assault rifles for personal, nonofficial use by a number of 
individual police officers in the 1990s.”); King Cnty. v. Sheehan, 57 P.3d 307, 310 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2002) (involving refused request for names and ranks of all police officers in 
department); Adam Dunn & Patrick J. Caceres, Constructing a Better Estimate of Police 
Misconduct, POL’Y MATTERS, Spring 2010, at 10, 14 (“Most police departments do not 
publish data on misconduct . . . .”). 
33. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN 
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 259–62 (Wesley G. Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE] (discussing 
problems with data on excessive and lethal force); Geller & Toch, supra note 30, at 297–302; 
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 28–34 (discussing problems with data 
concerning police misconduct); Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1045–52. 
34. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1430 (2011). 
35. Consider the success of William J. Bratton, who brought COMPSTAT to the New 
York Police Department in the 1990s and is often credited with bringing down crime rates in 
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incentives for police chiefs to collect and utilize data. 
On the other hand, public agents often face significant counter-
incentives that can lead them to underinvest in research that could 
improve policy.  Most significantly, police chiefs and politicians 
experience much of the cost of increased investment in obtaining 
information—in the form of delayed decision-making, opportunity costs, 
and increased accountability—but usually internalize only some of the 
benefits of improved policy.36  As a result, they are likely to devote 
fewer resources to research and data collection than the public would 
prefer.37 
Local chiefs and political agents face a particularly exaggerated 
incentive gap for investments in information that require coordination 
across agencies and municipalities.38  Collecting data that permit 
comparing the conduct of similar departments costs more, and the 
additional benefits to the actors who must coordinate are limited.  For 
example, comparing how much force different police departments use 
requires departments to coordinate on standardized forms, categories 
for force, and methods for digitizing and aggregating the data.39  The 
coordination necessary to create uniform standards and compliance with 
those centralized norms both impose additional costs on police 
departments.  Unless the cooperation is widespread, there will be little 
benefit from it, and even if it is widespread, each city will receive only a 
fraction of the benefits created.  It is also difficult to prevent free-
loading by departments that do not comply fully with the standards. 
As importantly, the same data that permit comparison across cities 
and, therefore, better decision-making and assessment, can also be used 
to increase accountability for ineffectual governance and to check self-
interested action by public officials.  This gives chiefs and politicians a 
further reason to avoid producing or making available this kind of 
 
New York City as a result.  Solomon Moore, Los Angeles Police Chief Is Quitting After 7 
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at A19.  COMPSTAT is a data-driven geographically-based 
accountability system for crime reduction and other policing goals.  Id.  After implementing 
COMPSTAT in New York, Bratton went on to lead the New York Police Department and 
the Los Angeles Police Department and now has a successful career in the private security 
sector.  Id.   
36. Stephenson, supra note 34, at 1431. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1464–68 (discussing particular challenges of acquiring information and making 
decisions when multiple agents are participating in the process). 
39. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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data.40  As a result, regulators and chiefs will frequently avoid collecting 
or coordinating information that would allow voters or regulators to 
compare departments.  Thus, we have little basis for judging how well 
chiefs avoid using force. 
In this way, police chiefs generate agency costs, both when they 
pursue personal agendas rather than those of the voting public, and also 
when they deprive the public and other political actors of information 
that can be used to detect the agency costs they impose.  They can limit 
public information either by refraining from collecting the information 
or by making it difficult to access and use.  Both methods inhibit 
scrutiny of the chiefs’ conduct, making it more difficult for the public to 
enforce its preferences about policing policy. 
In sum, information is crucial to the project of policing.  The public 
needs research and data to inform its preferences about the amounts 
and kinds of policing the local department should do.  Police chiefs and 
local policy makers need information to make good policy choices.  And 
state and federal courts, legislatures, and agencies need information 
about policing in setting criminal justice law and policy, in formulating 
law that incidentally affects the police, and in attempting to mitigate the 
costs of policing and the agency costs that local governance might entail.  
However, public choice problems and coordination difficulties lead to 
less production and distribution of information on policing than political 
actors and regulators need.  The policing we have is likely less effective 
and more socially and economically costly as a result. 
III. FEDERAL LAW AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE POLICE 
Today, much more than at the time of the Wickersham Commission, 
state and federal actors have tools to promote data production when 
local actors do not.  In practice, however, state and federal efforts to 
collect information about policing have been surprisingly limited.  
States—which regulate extensively how police officers are trained, 
hired, and disciplined—demand very little information about what 
 
40. See, e.g., Editorial, They Like Transparency, Until They Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2011, at A28 (“In recent years, the New York Civil Liberties Union had to sue to get stop-
and-frisk data from the police, details on the race of people shot by officers and shooting 
reports since 1997.  Most recently, the group has filed a suit on behalf of an online columnist 
asking for Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly’s calendar. . . .  Similarly, The Times was 
forced to go to court to get fuller access to police data.  A judge ruled early last month that 
the New York Police Department had improperly withheld information about pistol owners 
and the locations of hate crimes.”). 
13 HARMON (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:08 AM 
201x] WHY DO WE (STILL) LACK DATA ON POLICING? 1133 
police officers do.  Federal law appears to do more, since federal 
agencies have been tasked by Congress with collecting data about 
policing.  But agency efforts to collect national information about 
policing have focused far too narrowly to serve the interests of those 
governing and regulating the police. 
States presently mandate that police departments collect some kinds 
of data through state executive orders, legislation, and administrative 
regulations.  However, these efforts have been limited to a few subject 
areas and are often the product of lawsuits.  Thus, while some states 
have incident-based crime reporting systems for specific crimes and 
some collect law enforcement data to help detect racial profiling in 
traffic stops, there are few other kinds of data collection about police 
conduct common to states.41  In fact, states not only do little to 
encourage police departments to produce information about policing 
that does exist, they also often restrict public access to it through privacy 
laws and exemptions from open records statutes.42 
One can argue that state legislators face incentives better aligned 
with the public’s interest in investing in information about police 
conduct than those of local police chiefs, mayors, and city council 
members.  After all, law enforcement issues play a lesser role in state 
elections and state officials can more easily coordinate across agencies 
and develop law enforcement expertise.  But law enforcement interests 
can be powerfully influential at the state level, and data production may 
have fewer policy benefits for state actors than local voters or officials.43  
As a result, in data production, as in other areas, state law plays a 
limited role in the regulation of local policing. 
Federal efforts would seem more promising.  National coordination 
is much easier to achieve at the federal level, and Congress has long 
been active in regulating local law enforcement.44  Several offices in the 
U.S. Department of Justice have been tasked with ensuring that we have 
 
41. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 590.650, 590.653 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-
4(a)(2) (2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.131–.132 (West 2003); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 43.43.480 (West 2006); JUSTICE RESEARCH & STATISTICS ASS’N, USE OF 
DATA IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS: A SURVEY OF POLICE CHIEFS AND DATA ANALYSTS 6–7 
(2005) (discussing limited state data collection on crime). 
42. See Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 808; Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela 
Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line: Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files, 
COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 34–35. 
43. See Harmon, The Problem, supra note 7, at 813–14. 
44. See id. at 814–16. 
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adequate knowledge about local law enforcement.45  Nevertheless, 
federal data collection and research falls far short of what would be 
needed to assure informed decision-making on policing because the 
administrative agencies responsible for that data collection are heavily 
influenced by law enforcement interests. 
Federal law authorizes federal agencies to produce data on law 
enforcement, but those data are not well tailored to facilitate public 
accountability, strengthen local governance, or improve state and 
federal regulation of the police.  The most important national source of 
data about the criminal justice system is the Uniform Crime Report.  
Pursuant to the Uniform Crime Reporting program (UCR), the FBI 
“[o]perate[s] a central clearinghouse for police statistics”46 intended to 
provide a national indicator of the incidence of crime in the United 
States.47  Although focused on the incidence of crime, the UCR provides 
some information that could be useful for evaluations of law 
enforcement, including some employee data and case clearance rates.48  
 
45. The mission and function of the Bureau of Justice Statistics is to “collect, analyze, 
publish, and disseminate information on crime, criminal offenders, victims of crime, and the 
operation of justice systems at all levels of government” to assist policymaking in combating 
crime and ensuing that justice is “efficient and evenhanded.”  About the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2013).  The mission of the Office of Justice Programs is to “provide[] 
innovative leadership to federal, state, local, and tribal justice systems, by disseminating state-
of-the art knowledge and practices across America, and providing grants for the 
implementation of these crime fighting strategies.”  About Us, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).  The 
National Institute of Justice, which is the research, development and evaluation agency of the 
Department of Justice, is “dedicated to improving knowledge and understanding of crime and 
justice issues through science” in order to provide “knowledge and tools to reduce crime and 
promote justice, particularly at the state and local levels.”  About NIJ, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/about/welcome.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).  The mission of 
the FBI National Academy is “to support, promote, and enhance the personal and 
professional development of law enforcement leaders by preparing them for complex, 
dynamic, and contemporary challenges through innovative techniques, facilitating excellence 
in education and research, and forging partnerships throughout the world.”  The FBI 
Academy, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/training/national-
academy (last visited Feb. 27 2013).  The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is an 
“interagency law enforcement training organization for 91 Federal agencies” that also 
“provides services to state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement agencies.”  
Welcome to FLETC, FED. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER, http://www.fletc.gov/ 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
46. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(f) (2012). 
47. Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 534(a)(1), (f) (2006). 
48. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2011: OFFENSES CLEARED 1 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
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Police departments provide data for the UCR voluntarily and have 
conflicting incentives in reporting crimes, given that such data can be 
used to evaluate agency effectiveness.  The FBI has made only tepid 
efforts to ensure the integrity of UCR data, and many have expressed 
concern about the value of the data.49 
The UCR gets its data through the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS), a system intended to “take advantage of 
available crime data maintained in modern law enforcement records 
systems,”50 and by the older Summary Reporting System (SRS), under 
which police departments provide much less detail to the FBI.  For each 
of forty-six specific crimes, the NIBRS collects data on offense, victim, 
property, and arrestee.  Starting in 1988, the FBI began to encourage 
departments to use NIBRS in place of the SRS.  But NIBRS has been of 
limited success.  Some states have not yet implemented it, many 
departments have not yet supplied data to the FBI through NIBRS, and 
those departments that do supply data through NIBRS may not report 
all incidents.51  Beyond these weaknesses, it is notable that NIBRS was 
never intended to collect the rest of the data available in modern law 
enforcement records systems, including data about case clearance, the 
extent and kind of contact between police and victims and offenders, 
officers’ duties and supervision, the nature and result of disciplinary 
proceedings; citizen complaints; and information about police responses 
to service calls.  The creation and implementation of NIBRS provided 
an important opportunity to promote collection and aggregation of data 
 
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/clearancetopic_final.pdf; FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011: 
POLICE EMPLOYEES 1 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/policeemployees_main_final.pdf. 
49. James P. Lynch & John P. Jarvis, Missing Data and Imputation in the Uniform Crime 
Reports and the Effects on National Estimates, 24 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUST. 69, 69 
(2008) (noting that questions have arisen about the quality of uniform crime reporting data 
and citing criticisms). 
50. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTING HANDBOOK 3 (2004) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK]. 
51. Status of NIBRS in the States, IBR RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://www.jrsa.org/ibrrc/background-status/nibrs_states.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) 
(“As of June 2012, 32 states have been certified to report NIBRS to the FBI, and three 
additional states and the District of Columbia have individual agencies submitting NIBRS 
data.  Fifteen states are only submitting incident-based data, covering 100% of their state law 
enforcement agencies.  Approximately 29% of the population is covered by NIBRS 
reporting, representing 27% of the nation's reported crime and 43% of law enforcement 
agencies.”). 
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useful to those seeking to govern law enforcement as well as to those 
interested solely in facilitating it.  That opportunity passed unrealized, 
and the federal government does not collect or analyze most of the 
extensive data produced by police departments through incident and 
arrest reports, COMPSTAT, Early Intervention Systems, and other 
computer databases that might provide a basis for governing or 
regulating the police.52 
It is unsurprising that UCR and NIBRS are not tailored to produce 
data helpful in governing the police.  After all, the FBI conceives of 
police departments as the consumers of UCR data rather than its 
subjects.53  There is another agency tasked with collecting information 
about law enforcement as well as for it.  Congress created the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S. 
Department of Justice to produce and disseminate information about 
the criminal justice system, including law enforcement.  BJS has broad 
statutory authority to collect and analyze data about crime54 and the 
operation of the criminal justice system, and to provide that information 
to federal, state, and local governments, as well as the general public.55  
The agency is also authorized to promote data production and analytic 
capacity in police departments and in local and state governments by, 
for example, “recommend[ing] national standards for justice statistics,”56 
and by improving local computer information systems.57  Thus, BJS can 
and is intended to produce and promote the kinds information the 
public, local governments, and state and federal actors need to govern 
 
52. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING THE QUALITY, CREDIBILITY, AND 
RELEVANCE OF U.S. JUSTICE STATISTICS 205 (Robert M. Groves & Daniel L. Cork eds., 
2009) (proposing that BJS become involved in “compiling crime data from local 
departments” that already collect such information electronically).  Federal law also fails to 
promote uniformity in the generation of the data that would facilitate aggregation.  Thus, 
even if UCR crime data were perfect, it would be of limited use in evaluating, governing, and 
regulating police conduct. 
53. The purpose of the uniform crime reporting effort is to “present a nationwide view 
of crime.”  UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 1.  Furthermore, 
“[t]he culmination of [the Uniform Crime Report] national data collection effort is three 
annual publications: Crime in the United States, Hate Crime Statistics, and Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed and Assaulted, all of which have become sources of data widely used by law 
enforcement administrators, government policy makers, social science researchers, the media, 
and private citizens.”  Id. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3732(c)(3) (2006). 
55. § 3732(c)(10). 
56. § 3732(c)(8). 
57. § 3732(c)(13). 
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policing.  In practice, however, these data too are not tailored to the 
governance or regulatory needs described in Part I. 
BJS does provide some extremely relevant data.  It conducts the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which is an essential 
complement to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports in painting a national 
portrait of serious criminal activity.58  Thus, BJS, like the FBI, helps to 
gather nationally comparable crime data that can begin to build a basis 
for more effective governance and policy making about policing.  BJS 
also adds a triennial supplement to the NCVS, the Police-Public Contact 
Survey (PPCS).  The PPCS was originally intended to facilitate study the 
of excessive force by law enforcement officers,59 and it continues to 
provide revealing data about the nature, frequency, and context of 
contacts between the police and the public, as well as the views of the 
public about those interactions, which could be used to compare a 
department’s practices to national averages.60  BJS’s data gathering 
efforts, however, suffer from a variety of shortcomings, both by design 
and due to resource limitations and execution problems, which limit 
their value in critical ways. 
BJS’s primary data-gathering tool on law enforcement is the Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) 
survey, conducted every three years.61  The survey is given to all 
agencies with 100 or more sworn officers and to a stratified random 
sample of agencies with fewer than 100 sworn officers.62  The survey’s 
 
58. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2004: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 510 app. IV (2004), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/CIUS2004.pdf (“Each of these programs produces 
valuable information about aspects of the Nation’s crime problem . . . .  [T]he information 
they produce together provides a more comprehensive panorama of the Nation’s crime 
problem than either could produce alone.”). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14142(a) (instructing the Attorney General to “acquire data about the 
use of excessive force by law enforcement officers”). 
60. E.g., CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf (summarizing the findings of the 2008 
PPCS and noting highlights such as that an “estimated 9 out of 10 residents who had contact 
with police in 2008 felt the police acted properly” but that a “majority of the people who had 
force used or threatened against them said they felt it was excessive”). 
61. “Conducted every 3 to 4 years, LEMAS collects data from over 3,000 state and local 
law enforcement agencies . . . .”  Data Collection: Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?t
y=dcdetail&iid=248 (last revised Apr. 19, 2010). 
62. E.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 8 (2010), available 
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questions are generally multiple choice and are “intended to be filled 
out with relatively little need to refer to available records,”63 a measure 
of its limited scope.  The LEMAS survey focuses on administrative 
matters such as employee counts and demographics, budgets, technical 
resources, and some specific policies.64  In addition, every four years, 
BJS conducts a Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 
the main purpose of which is to produce a sampling frame for the 
LEMAS survey.65  This survey collects information on all state and local 
law enforcement agencies, but is limited to a two-page questionnaire 
about matters such as the number of sworn and civilian employees in the 
agency, the agency’s functions and primary activities, and its budget 
level.66  BJS has also twice conducted a Census of Law Enforcement 
Training Academies, which provides important information about the 
kind and amount of training provided to law enforcement officers.67  In 
 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf (“The selected local police sample 
includes all departments employing 100 or more full-time sworn personnel and a systematic 
random sample of smaller agencies stratified by size.”). 
63. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 109. 
64. Data Collection: Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS), supra note 61 (“Data are obtained on the organization and administration of 
police and sheriffs’ departments, including agency responsibilities, operating expenditures, 
job functions of sworn and civilian employees, officer salaries and special pay, demographic 
characteristics of officers, weapons and armor policies, education and training requirements, 
computers and information systems, vehicles, special units, and community policing 
activities.”). 
65. See id.; see also BRIAN A. REAVES, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1, 12 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [hereinafter REAVES, 2008].  BJS also conducts more focused surveys of 
special law enforcement agencies such as campus police forces and coroners’ offices.  E.g., 
MATTHEW J. HICKMAN ET AL., MEDICAL EXAMINERS AND CORONERS’ OFFICES, 2004 
(2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/meco04.pdf; BRIAN A. REAVES, 
CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2004–05 (2008) [hereinafter REAVES, 2008], available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cle0405.pdf. 
66. See REAVES, 2008, supra note 65, at 12 (“Employment data are reported by agencies 
for sworn and nonsworn (civilian) personnel and, within these categories, by full-time or part-
time status.  Agencies also complete a checklist of functions they regularly perform, or have 
primary responsibility for, within the following areas: patrol and response, criminal 
investigation, traffic and vehicle-related functions, detention-related functions, court-related 
functions, special public safety functions (e.g., animal control), task force participation, and 
specialized functions (e.g., search and rescue).”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000 CENSUS OF 
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/p
df/cj38sp.pdf. 
67. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2002, at iv (2005), available at 
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addition, BJS has occasionally solicited information about state law 
enforcement agencies policies with respect to recording data on race in 
traffic stops.68 
Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of the collection efforts, the 
data BJS produces do not reveal a national picture about police policies 
or practices or about the costs and benefits of policing as it is carried out 
today.  We do not know enough about what police do to assess which 
practices best reduce crime and disorder or which practices are least 
intrusive.  Without such information, local governments cannot easily 
choose effective and harm-efficient policing strategies, and states and 
federal legislatures cannot incentivize them to do so.  Part of the 
problem is resources.  BJS has a much smaller budget than other federal 
statistical bureaus and yet has a much larger mandate.69  Largely as a 
result, even in the area in which it is most active, crime data, and 
certainly with respect to law enforcement practices and policies, its 
survey lacks subnational geographic detail and questions tailored for 
effective policy making.  In addition, in the face of increasing costs and a 
flat budget, BJS has cut corners over the years, leading to degraded 
rather than strengthened products.70 
Even within existing resources, BJS’s triennial law enforcement 
survey suffers from an extremely narrow focus.  As a recent National 
Research Council report concluded: 
BJS’s work in law enforcement is hindered by a sharp and overly 
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta02.pdf; BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2006, at 1–6 
(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta06.pdf. 
68. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 119 (describing efforts of the BJS to collect 
information from state police agencies “about policies for recording data on race and 
ethnicity of persons stopped on traffic violations”); e.g., MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTION POLICIES FOR STATE POLICE, 2004, at 1 
(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tsdcp04.pdf. 
69. See Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 19 (“BJS has been given more responsibilities 
than can be achieved with current resources.  The resources provided to BJS to carry out its 
work are not commensurate with the breadth—and importance—of the responsibilities 
assigned to the agency by its authorizing legislation.”); id. at 209–10 (describing the funding 
levels of the principal statistical agencies of the federal government).  The National Center 
for Education Statistics, the primary federal education statistics agency, for example, has 
direct funding levels several times that of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as does the national 
Center for Health Statistics, the Energy Information Administration, the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, and others. 
70. Id. at 19–21 (discussing the implications of the fiscal constraints BJS has faced over 
the years). 
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restrictive focus on management and administrative issues; its 
analysis of law enforcement generally lacks direct connection to 
data on crime, much less providing the basis for assessing the 
quality and effectiveness of police programs.  It is also in the area 
of law enforcement, with the proliferation of numerous special-
agency censuses and little semblance of a fixed schedule or 
interconnectedness of series, where the need for refining the 
conceptual framework for multiple data collections is most 
evident.71 
Beyond management and administrative information, BJS’s efforts 
to uncover information about law enforcement are modest: The Contact 
Survey focuses primarily on the basis for traffic stops and uses of force.72  
The survey of state police agencies on traffic stops has been conducted 
only twice, and asked only about policies with respect to collecting race 
and ethnicity data, not about the number of stops or the justification for 
them.73  The survey of training academies asks about how many hours of 
training are devoted to different subjects, but little about the content of 
the training.  As the National Research Council concluded, “[a] look at 
BJS’s portfolio . . . leaves the unfortunate impression that the state of 
knowledge about ‘law enforcement’ generally can be equated with the 
head- and resource-count totals in the LEMAS survey and agency 
censuses.”74  As a result, “BJS reports [are] silent on the most basic 
notions of effectiveness of police policies or personnel decisions,” much 
less the harm-efficiency of those departmental practices.75  Furthermore, 
the problem is self-reinforcing: BJS now produces the statistics made 
possible by its now well-established instruments,76 rather than basing 
 
71. Id. at 133. 
72. E.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008 PPCS Final Questionnaire 1–2, available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppcs08_q.pdf. 
73. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATE POLICE TRAFFIC STOP DATA 
COLLECTION PROCEDURES, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ssp1q.pdf. 
74. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 146. 
75. Id. at 147.  When BJS expresses concern about the scope of its own law enforcement 
efforts, it focuses almost exclusively on producing more data on force used by the police and 
to a lesser degree, on citizen complaints.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Sedgwick & Gerard Ramker, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, BJS Provides Update on Projects and Priorities, JRSA FORUM, June 2007, at 
3, available at http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/forum/forum_issues/for25_2.pdf.  Others have been 
more critical.  See Dunn & Caceres, supra note 32, at 11 (“The bureau’s narrow focus likely 
leads to a substantial undercounting of incidents of police misconduct.”). 
76. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 146 (“Law enforcement statistics within BJS have 
been largely defined by the specific LEMAS data collection vehicle, and not a substantive 
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BJS’s data collection efforts on a thick conception about the purpose of 
law enforcement data.  There have been proposals to improve federal 
law enforcement data collection to make it more usable for police policy 
evaluation,77 but as of yet they have gone unheeded. 
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of BJS’s own data collection efforts, 
the Bureau also has both authority and funding to promote data 
collection by police departments and state and local governments that 
could be the basis of improved policing.78  However, the State Justice 
Statistics program grants overwhelmingly promote databases for 
criminal law enforcement rather than databases that could be used to 
compare departments, to evaluate the costs and benefits of law 
enforcement practices, or for other governance and regulatory goals.79  
 
definition of the activities and actors that constitute law enforcement.”). 
77. E.g., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 33, 
at 329 (“The committee recommends expanding data collection to encompass a wider range 
of policing outcomes, to enable the monitoring of the quality of police service and not just its 
quantity.”). 
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3732(c)(1), (13) (2006) (authorizing the Bureau to make grants and 
authorizing the Bureau to “provide for the development of justice information systems 
programs and assistance to the States and units of local government relating to collection, 
analysis, or dissemination of justice statistics”). 
79. The State Justice Statistics Program includes the following themes that state 
Statistical Analysis Centers can choose: 
1. Deaths in Police Custody Reporting - Obtaining statewide data on deaths 
occurring in the process of arrest or in pursuit of arrest.  
2. Criminal justice system crisis planning  
3. Increased access to data  
4. Performance measurement  
5. Analyses utilizing a state's criminal history records  
6. Statewide crime victimization surveys  
7. Analysis of the uses of new or emerging biometric technologies to improve the 
administration of criminal justice  
8. Research using incident-based crime data that are compatible with the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)  
9. Data collection and/or research examining a special topical area:  
a. Minority overrepresentation in the criminal or juvenile justice  
systems  
b. Civil justice  
c. Cybercrime  
d. Human trafficking  
e. Justice issues in Indian Country  
f. Criminal activity in U.S. border areas  
g. Violent crime in schools  
h. The impact of substance abuse on state and/or local criminal  
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Thus, we have the Crime Identification Technology Act of 1988, the 
National Criminal History Improvement Program, the NICS 
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 and similar statutes and grant 
programs that seek to improve automated fingerprint identification 
systems, instant criminal background check systems, and other 
computerized systems about crime, forensics, and criminals, but little 
support for a national database of police officers decertified by state 
administrative mechanisms and none for a database of civil suits and 
consent decrees against police departments.80  BJS has not offered 
grants to promote uniform data collection by states from police 
departments on law enforcement subjects (other than crime), or to 
facilitate research on the non-financial costs of law enforcement 
techniques.81 
BJS and the FBI produce narrow data because of institutional 
constraints.  Like local law enforcement and political actors, these 
federal agencies, and the federal legislators responsible for creating and 
overseeing them, have inadequate incentives to produce optimal 
amounts of information about policing.  Inadequate data collection 
efforts are a symptom of that problem.  The FBI, the flagship federal 
policing agency, depends on close cooperation with local law 
enforcement for its work, and is thus ill-situated to collect data and 
 
justice and public health systems  
i. Family violence and/or stalking  
State  Justice  Statistics  Program,  BUREAU  OF  JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=48 (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).  BJS has awarded some grants to allow 
states to improve performance assessment tools that might include law enforcement. 
80. The Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-251, § 102, 112 Stat. 
1870, 1871 (1998).  Similarly, “BJS provides direct awards and technical assistance to states 
and localities to improve the quality, timeliness, and immediate accessibility of criminal 
history records and related information” through the National Criminal History 
Improvement Program.  National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 (last revised Feb. 28, 
2013). 
81. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-
0329, 2010 SURVEY OF GENERAL PURPOSE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
SOLICITATION(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgplea10sol.pdf; 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
HISTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (NCHIP) SOLICITATION (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/nchip09sol.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0323, RECOVERY ACT (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/recoveryact09.pdf.  Even in the areas that BJS does 
promote information technology for state and local police agencies, the agency has not always 
furthered the national project of data collection. 
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shape research to allow other political actors to supervise those 
departments. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, given its duties, BJS is also structurally 
hobbled.  First, because the Director of BJS is politically appointed and 
serves an unspecified term at the pleasure of the President, and because 
BJS is located within the Justice Department, BJS is subject to political 
influence that is likely to be favorable to law enforcement interests.  
This is best evidenced by events surrounding a 2005 press release 
announcing the results of the 2002 Police Public Contact Survey.  The 
BJS draft of the press release provided statistics indicating that the 
likelihood of being stopped by police in 2002 did not differ significantly 
between white, black, and Hispanic drivers, but that police were more 
likely to carry out some type of search or use of force on a black or 
Hispanic driver.82  The then-Assistant Attorney General ordered the 
Director of BJS to delete references to the higher rates of searches and 
uses of force for black and Hispanic drivers.  The BJS Director refused 
and was dismissed from his position.83  The report was issued without a 
press release and languished until news reporting over the Director’s 
firing drew attention to it.84  The next PPCS survey results were released 
 
82. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-340, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS: QUALITY GUIDELINES GENERALLY FOLLOWED FOR POLICE-PUBLIC 
CONTACT SURVEYS, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO HELP ASSURE AGENCY 
INDEPENDENCE 21–22 (2007) (“The press release that BJS sought to publish would have 
included the following statistical findings from the accompanying Police-Public Contact 
Survey report: (1) there was no statistically significant difference between the rates that white 
and minority drivers reported being stopped by police, and (2) once stopped, a larger 
percentage of black and Hispanic minority drivers reported police using or threatening to use 
force against them than did whites.”). 
83. See Eric Lichtblau, Democrats Want Official to Be Reinstated Over Report on 
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at A11 (“Democrats in Congress called . . . for the 
reinstatement of a Justice Department official who objected to his supervisors’ effort to play 
down the findings of a federal report on racial profiling.”); Eric Lichtblau, Profiling Report 
Leads to a Clash and a Demotion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at A1 (“The Bush 
administration is replacing the director of a small but critical branch of the Justice 
Department, months after he complained that senior political officials at the department were 
seeking to play down newly compiled data on the aggressive police treatment of black and 
Hispanic drivers.”). 
84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 82, at 21–22 (“Despite reported 
efforts on the part of both parties to negotiate alternative language with respect to the 
content of the press release, they could not resolve their differences and the BJS Director 
decided that a press release would not be issued.”); Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 227–28 
(“In August 2005, the New York Times, followed by other media outlets, reported on a string 
of events over the previous 4 months that culminated in the removal of BJS Director 
Lawrence Greenfeld.  The removal was precipitated by disputes within the Justice 
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with a statement noting that black and Hispanic drivers were more 
likely to be searched but without statistics detailing the matter.  The 
release emphasized that “such racial disparities do not necessarily 
demonstrate that police treat people differently based on race or other 
demographic characteristics” and noted explicitly that the study “did not 
take into account other factors that might explain these disparities.”85  
Without more independence from political influence, it is difficult to 
imagine BJS providing the data necessary to ensure police 
accountability. 
Second, BJS’s location inside the Office of Justice Programs 
potentially distorts its mission.  The Office of Justice Programs is tasked 
with “provid[ing] information to the President, the Congress, the 
judiciary, State and local governments, and the general public relating to 
criminal justice.”86  This mission seems ideally suited to ensuring 
adequate information for public governance and state and local 
regulation of police departments.  But in practice OJP orients itself to a 
more circumscribed audience and therefore a more limited subject 
matter.   
OJP is the successor to the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, and its primary function is to provide grants to state 
and local law enforcement agencies.87  Rather than serve both law 
enforcement and those who govern and regulate it, OJP remains 
oriented toward serving law enforcement.  It seeks “[t]o be the premier 
resource for the justice community by: [(1)] [p]roviding and 
coordinating information, research and development, statistics, training, 
and support to help the justice community build the capacity it needs to 
meet its public safety goals,” and “[(2)] [e]mbracing local decision-
making, while encouraging local innovation through [strong and 
intelligent] national policy leadership.”88  It also focuses on “provid[ing] 
 
Department over the statement of findings from the [Police Public Contact Survey].” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
85. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Police Stop White, Black and Hispanic 
Drivers at Similar Rates According to Department of Justice Report (Apr. 29, 2007), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpp05pr.cfm. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 3712(a)(3) (2006) (listing the authorities of the assistant attorney general 
heading the Office of Justice Programs); see § 3711 (establishing OJP within the Justice 
Department with an assistant attorney general as its head). 
87. Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 40 (“BJS inherits a strong focus of attention on the 
needs of state and local law enforcement, since OJP is the legal successor of the previous Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration.”). 
88. Mission and Vision, OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, 
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Federal leadership in developing the nation’s capacity to prevent and 
control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims.”89   
BJS’s funding is a small piece of OJP’s budget, and generally, it is 
allocated internally within OJP rather than from outside it.90  Since OJP 
is oriented towards law enforcement, and BJS must compete with grant 
programs within OJP for resources, it is not surprising that BJS too is 
oriented towards data useful for crime control rather than ensuring that 
the costs of law enforcement practices are worth their benefits.  OJP—
like the FBI—serves police departments more than it serves those who 
might govern and regulate law enforcement: the public, municipal policy 
makers, state police standards and training boards, state legislatures, the 
federal judiciary, and Congress.91 
As a result, BJS plays too limited a role in producing information 
useful for governing or regulating policing.  The data BJS provide an 
inadequate basis for assessing the effectiveness of law enforcement 
techniques, the financial and non-financial costs of existing and 
alternative law enforcement approaches, and the incentives facing law 
enforcement actors, among other information essential to effectively 
evaluating policing strategies.  Moreover, though the interests of law 
enforcement and the interests of the public and political actors who 
regulate law enforcement are often aligned in favor of effective crime 
control, as noted in Parts I and II, those groups’ interests can also 
diverge both substantively and with respect to the dissemination of 
information.  This suggests that without external support, the needed 
data will never materialize. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Third Degree was a remarkable accomplishment.  It brought to 
national consciousness a long-standing problem of policing and led to 
 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
89. See Leigh Benda, Foreword to OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, 2011 FINANCIAL GUIDE (Revised July 2012), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/financialguide/PDFs/OCFO_2012FinancialGuide.pdf. 
90. See Groves & Cork, supra note 52, at 40 (“Administratively, BJS is an organ of OJP 
within the U.S. Department of Justice.”). 
91. Moreover, BJS’s connection to law enforcement interests is not entirely external.  
While the PPCS has its origins in Congressional efforts to facilitate better regulation of police 
uses of force, the LEMAS survey—the most important of its data collection tools—has its 
origins in earlier police salary and administration surveys conducted by the Kansas City 
Police Department and the Fraternal Order of the Police. 
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reforms that reduced the problem.  In its last paragraphs, the report 
suggests some of the complexity of the relationship among law, politics, 
and policing: law is a check on police conduct, but it must be enforced to 
make a difference; political will facilitates enforcement, but requires 
information; police officers will not always generate or share adequate 
information about policing, but they are necessarily part of the project 
of doing so.  The tasks of governing and regulating the police continue 
today, and in light of the intricate web of local, state, and federal laws 
affecting the police, they are more complicated than ever. 
These tasks are not at odds with promoting good policing, but rather 
are essential to it.  Both local governance and state and federal 
regulation are necessary to ensure that publicly-provided policing is 
effective and yet minimally harmful and costly.  Even more than the 
report’s authors imagined, information is a precondition for achieving 
these tasks, and federal data collection tailored to governing and 
regulating the police is a necessary component of that information.  As 
of yet, the agencies responsible for that data collection do not 
recognize—much less fulfill—this mission.  Until they do, our policing 
policy will suffer. 
